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We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are
willing to repeatedly ￿nance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit
relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender is unable to observe the borrower￿ s
ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract;
(iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract;
and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The
lender￿ s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgive-
ness. Asymmetric information gives rise to the property of delayed settlement, which is
a contingency in which the lender allows the borrower to defer the repayment of his loan
in exchange for more favorable terms of credit within the relationship. This property,
together with the borrowers￿lack of commitment, gives rise to debt forgiveness. When
the borrower￿ s participation constraint binds, the lender needs to ￿forgive￿part of the
borrower￿ s debt to keep him in the relationship. Finally, we study the impact of the
changes in the initial cost of lending on the terms of credit.
Keywords: Unsecured Loans; Dynamic Contracting; Delayed Settlement; Debt For-
giveness; Initial Cost of Lending. JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D8, E4, G2.
11. INTRODUCTION
We study long-term credit arrangements in the Lagos-Wright model; see Lagos and Wright
(2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). To motivate trade and credit, we consider a ver-
sion of the model in which there is an intertemporal double coincidence of wants. To allow
for the use of intertemporal incentives, we depart from the baseline model by relaxing the
assumption that agents cannot engage in enduring relationships. Speci￿cally, we charac-
terize the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to
repeatedly ￿nance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by extending direct credit. Lenders
enter the credit market by posting the terms of the contract, and each borrower chooses with
whom he wants to engage in a credit relationship. We use the techniques of the dynamic
contracting literature to solve for the lender￿ s optimal contract.1
Our approach is consistent with the endogenously incomplete markets literature [see
Sleet (2008)] in which trading arrangements are derived from primitive frictions instead of
assumed. The frictions we choose to model are as follows. First, lenders are unable to
observe a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan. Second, lenders can commit to some contracts,
whereas borrowers cannot commit to any contract. Speci￿cally, lenders are committed
to delivering any long-term contract that does not result in an expected value that, at
any moment, is lower than that associated with autarky, whereas borrowers are unable
to commit to any long-term contract. Third, transactions within each credit relationship
are not publicly observable, which captures the idea that information is dispersed in credit
markets. Fourth, it is costly for a lender to contact a borrower, as in Drozd and Nosal
(2008) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), and it is also costly for a lender to walk
away from a contract with a borrower, as in Phelan (1995). Given these frictions, we derive
the terms of the contract that lenders o⁄er to borrowers in a competitive credit market.
We build on the analysis in Phelan (1995) in which a lender and a borrower engage in
a dynamic credit relationship. In Phelan￿ s analysis, the borrower is able to quit from the
1See Green (1987); Thomas and Worrall (1990); Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995); Kocherlakota (1996);
Aiyagari and Williamson (1999); and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
2lender￿ s contract only at the beginning of each period before learning his income realization.
Thus, there is a one-period commitment to a contract. The Lagos-Wright structure of
sequential trade and intertemporal double coincidence of wants makes the timing within
each period critical. There is a distinct settlement stage following each round of transactions,
which allows the borrowers to periodically discharge their past debts.2 However, there is a
friction that a⁄ects a borrower￿ s ability to repay his past obligations during the settlement
stage, which creates a motive for long-term credit arrangements. Speci￿cally, the Lagos-
Wright model results in a sequence of ex post participation constraints for the borrower (as
opposed to one ex ante constraint as in Phelan￿ s analysis) because the latter has an incentive
to walk away precisely at the settlement stage. As a result, we obtain a model of unsecured
lending that allows us to characterize the loan schedule that the lender is committed to
delivering as well as the repayment amounts that are required from the borrower.
One important characteristic of a credit transaction is that settlement takes place at a
future date: each credit transaction between a borrower and a lender necessarily creates a
liability for the borrower that needs to be settled some time in the future. Because the ￿ ow
of payments between them is explicit in the Lagos-Wright framework, we can use the model
to make predictions with respect to movements in loan and repayment amounts over time,
which are observable characteristics in credit markets. Another advantage of the model is
that, because of the existence of an intertemporal double coincidence of wants, the gains
from trade within a credit relationship are also explicit: There is a surplus from a match
between a borrower and a lender that needs to be shared. Long-term unsecured credit is
the optimal ￿nancial arrangement for the lender given that she needs to post the terms of
the contract in order to enter the credit market. Moreover, the intertemporal punishments
and rewards implicit in the lender￿ s optimal contract are meaningful in terms of observed
behavior in credit markets. As a result, we can use the model to study revolving lines of
credit and debt renegotiation as equilibrium outcomes.
2Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2008) use the Lagos-Wright framework to show that the existence of a
settlement round in which the agents have an opportunity to discharge their debt is essential for implementing
constrained e¢ cient allocations.
3The focus on the borrower￿ s lack of commitment is crucial for the analysis. To con-
struct a model of bilateral contracting, one crucial step consists of identifying for whom the
commitment problem is more relevant. For modeling an insurance contract, the relevant
commitment problem is for the insurer (the principal), who has received the premium pay-
ments from the policyholders and has capitalized to make a disbursement when a speci￿c
event materializes. For modeling a credit contract, the relevant commitment problem is for
the borrower (the agent), who has received a loan and is required to settle his debt at some
speci￿ed date. In our model, the party who lacks commitment can certainly be identi￿ed
as a borrower, which makes the analysis special for studying unsecured lending. For this
reason, the role of the ex post participation constraints is crucial for the interpretation of
the optimal dynamic contract as a long-term credit arrangement.
We characterize the lender￿ s optimal contract and derive two key properties: delayed
settlement and debt forgiveness. The property of delayed settlement is a contingency that
allows the borrower to defer the repayment of his loan to a future date. As a result of
the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives, the lender allows the borrower to delay
his repayment in exchange for more favorable terms of credit for future transactions within
the credit relationship, which translate into decreasing loan amounts and weakly increasing
repayment amounts. This mechanism arises because the lender needs to provide incentives
for collecting a repayment from the borrower.
The second key property of the lender￿ s optimal contract is debt forgiveness. As we have
seen, a delayed repayment worsens the terms for the borrower. If the borrower postpones his
repayment for long enough (due to a string of unfavorable shocks to his ability to repay),
his participation constraint will eventually bind because the lender will keep worsening
the terms of the contract, which in turn creates an incentive for him to walk away from
his current contract and sign with another lender. To keep him in the relationship, the
lender with whom he is currently paired needs to ￿forgive￿part of his previous debt. As a
result, there is a minimum loan amount that the lender is committed to delivering to the
borrower and a maximum repayment amount that she is able to collect from him because
of competition in the credit market and a lack of commitment by borrowers. Thus, it is
4the combination of asymmetric information with lack of commitment that results in debt
forgiveness as an equilibrium outcome.
Finally, we use the model to study the e⁄ects of a change in the initial cost of lending on
the terms of the contract.3 A lower cost of starting a credit relationship has the following
impact on the equilibrium outcome: (i) each borrower is better o⁄ from the perspective
of the contracting date; (ii) a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility ￿ uctuates within a
smaller set; and (iii) each lender is uniformly worse o⁄ ex post. A lower cost of entry in
the credit market leads to more competition among lenders, which in turn results in more
favorable terms of credit for each borrower.
2. THE MODEL
Time is discrete and continues forever, and each period is divided into two subperiods.
There are two types of agents, referred to as borrowers and lenders. In the ￿rst subperiod,
a lender is able to produce the unique perishable consumption good but does not want to
consume, and a borrower wants to consume but cannot produce. In the second subperiod,
we have the opposite situation: A borrower is able to produce but does not want to consume,
and a lender wants to consume but cannot produce. Production and consumption take place
within each subperiod. This generates an intertemporal double coincidence of wants, and
for this reason, we refer to the ￿rst subperiod as the transaction stage and to the second
subperiod as the settlement stage. The types (borrower and lender) refer to the agent￿ s role
in the transaction stage. The production technology allows each agent to produce one unit
of the good with one unit of labor. Each agent receives an endowment of h > 0 units of
time in each subperiod. Let ￿ 2 (0;1) be the common discount factor over periods.








3We think this is an interesting exercise because there is signi￿cant evidence showing that the cost of
starting a credit relationship has fallen signi￿cantly over the past two decades. For instance, Mester (1997)
points out that the use of credit scoring has signi￿cantly reduced the time and cost of the loan approval
process. Barron and Staten (2003) and Berger (2003) also provide evidence suggesting that advances in
information technology have reduced the cost of processing information for lenders.
5of the good in the transaction stage and xl
t is consumption of the good in the settlement
stage. The borrower￿ s momentary utility of consuming qb
t units of the consumption good





. Assume that u : R+ ! R is increasing,
strictly concave, and continuously di⁄erentiable. Let H denote the inverse of u, and let
wa ￿ u(0) denote the value associated with autarky. Producing yb
t units of the good in the
settlement stage generates disutility (1 ￿ ￿)yb
t for a borrower. However, there is a friction
that a⁄ects a borrower￿ s ability to produce goods in the settlement stage. With probability
￿ a borrower is unable to produce the consumption good, and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ a
borrower can produce the good using the linear production technology. This productivity
shock is independently and identically distributed over time and across borrowers. Each
borrower learns his productivity shock at the beginning of the settlement stage, which is
privately observed. Finally, let D denote the set of expected discounted utilities for the
borrower.
Suppose that there is a large number of borrowers and lenders, with the set of lenders
su¢ ciently large.4 There is a one-shot cost k > 0 in terms of the consumption good for
a lender to post a credit contract to enter the credit market, which speci￿es consumption
and production by each party as a function of the available information. As in Drozd and
Nosal (2008) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), we motivate this assumption as the
cost of contacting a borrower in the credit market and starting a credit relationship. We
assume that each lender can have at most one borrower; it is in￿nitely costly for a lender
to contact two borrowers at the same time. Given that the lenders are risk-neutral, this
assumption is innocuous in that it does not a⁄ect the terms of the contract that they o⁄er
in the credit market, allowing us to focus on the bilateral gains from trade associated with a
credit relationship. Each lender also has to pay a cost ￿ > 0 to walk away from her current
contract. As in Phelan (1995), we motivate this assumption as a legal cost that a lender
has to pay to e⁄ectively walk away from her current contract with a borrower.
Only the agents in a bilateral meeting observe the history of trades. Other agents in the
economy observe a break in a particular match but do not observe the history of trades
4The set of lenders is su¢ ciently large so that a borrower always ￿nds a lender willing to trade with him.
6in that match. Notice that there are gains from trade since a lender can produce the
consumption good for a borrower in the ￿rst subperiod (transaction stage) and a borrower
can produce the good for a lender in the second subperiod (settlement stage). An important
feature of the model is that, with probability ￿, a borrower is unable to produce the good
in the second subperiod and settle his debt.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we characterize the stationary equilibrium allocation under a particular
pricing mechanism: price posting by lenders. To enter the credit market, a lender needs
to post a contract to attract a borrower and start a credit relationship. Although it is
costly for a lender to make contact with a borrower, there is free entry of lenders in the
credit market. We characterize the terms of the contract in each credit relationship in
the economy and restrict attention to a symmetric, stationary equilibrium in which each
borrower receives a market-determined credit contract o⁄ered by a lender that promises
him expected discounted utility w￿, from the perspective of the contracting date. Each
lender needs to provide incentives to induce the desired behavior by a borrower given that
a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan is unobservable.5
We assume that lenders can commit to some credit contracts, whereas borrowers cannot
commit to any contract. Speci￿cally, each lender is committed to delivering any long-term
contract that does not result in an expected discounted utility that, at any moment, is lower
than that associated with autarky; recall that a lender always has the option of remaining
inactive. On the other hand, borrowers cannot commit to any long-term contract and can
walk away from a credit relationship at any moment without any pecuniary punishment.
As we will see, a lender￿ s optimal contract results in a long-term relationship from which
neither party wants to deviate.
The expected discounted utility w￿ 2 D associated with the market contract must be
5Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to Markovian equilibrium in that borrowers are not di⁄er-
entiated by whether they have ever walked away from a contract and the market expected utility is w
￿ at
each date.
7such that it makes each lender indi⁄erent between entering the credit market by posting a
contract and remaining inactive, from the perspective of the contracting date. As a result,
some lenders post a contract and successfully match with a borrower, while others do not
post a contract and remain inactive. When o⁄ering her own contract, each lender takes
as given the contracts o⁄ered by the other lenders. The only relevant characteristic about
these contracts is the expected discounted utility w￿ that each borrower associates with
them. This is the utility that a borrower obtains by accepting a lender￿ s contract, from the
perspective of the signing date. The equilibrium is symmetric because every active lender
o⁄ers the same credit contract.
The market contract must always result in an expected discounted utility for a borrower
that is greater than or equal to w￿. If the market contract promises, in a given period, an
expected discounted utility w0 for a borrower that is less than w￿, the latter can do better
by reneging on his current contract and starting a new credit relationship with another
lender. Recall that inactive lenders observe the dissolution of a credit relationship and may
be willing to enter the credit market. Given that there is free entry of lenders and limited
commitment, we can have an equilibrium only if the lowest promised expected discounted
utility at any moment is exactly w￿.
3.1. Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem
A contract speci￿es in every period a transfer of the good from the lender to the borrower
in the transaction stage and a repayment (a transfer of the good from the borrower to the
lender) in the settlement stage as a function of the available history of reports by the
borrower. These are reports about a borrower￿ s ability to produce goods in the settlement





t denote a partial history of reports, where ￿￿ = 0
means that a borrower is unable to produce the good in the settlement stage at date ￿ and
￿￿ = 1 means that he is able to produce it in the settlement stage at date ￿.
In equilibrium, each active lender chooses to o⁄er a long-term contract, which means
that she matches with a borrower at the ￿rst date and keeps him in the credit relationship
8forever. The long-term contract speci￿es quantities produced and transferred within each
subperiod. We say that in each period t there is a transaction between a borrower and a
lender that consists of a loan amount from the lender to the borrower in the ￿rst subperiod
(transaction stage) and a repayment amount in the second subperiod (settlement stage)
that is contingent on the report of the productive state of nature (￿t = 1).
The optimal contracting problem has a recursive formulation in which we can use a
borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w 2 D as the state variable. The optimal contract
minimizes the expected discounted cost for the lender of providing expected discounted
utility w to the borrower subject to incentive compatibility. As we have seen, w￿ is the
lower bound on the set of expected discounted utilities. Let ￿ w denote the upper bound,
which is endogenously determined but is taken as given for now. Let C(w￿; ￿ w) : [w￿; ￿ w] ! R
denote the expected discounted cost for the lender, which satis￿es the following functional
equation:





(1 ￿ ￿)[H (u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1]+
￿
￿






Here, the choices are given by ’ = (u;y1;w0;w1), where u denotes a borrower￿ s momentary
utility of consumption in the transaction stage, y1 denotes his production in the settlement
stage given that he is able to produce the good, and w￿ denotes his promised expected
discounted utility at the beginning of the following period given that his report in the
current period is ￿ 2 f0;1g. Recall that ￿ = 0 means that a borrower is unable to produce
the good in the settlement stage and that ￿ = 1 means that he is able to produce it. The
constraint set ￿(w￿; ￿ w) (w) consists of all ’ in D ￿ [0;h] ￿ [w￿; ￿ w]
2 satisfying the borrower￿ s
participation constraints,
w0 ￿ w￿, (2)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 ￿ ￿w￿, (3)
the borrower￿ s truth-telling constraint,
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 ￿ ￿w0, (4)
9and the promise-keeping constraint,
(1 ￿ ￿)[u ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1] + ￿ [￿w0 + (1 ￿ ￿)w1] = w. (5)
It can be shown that, for any ￿xed lower bound w￿ and upper bound ￿ w, there exists a
unique continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex function C(w￿; ￿ w) :
[w￿; ￿ w] ! R satisfying the functional equation (1). Let ^ u : [w￿; ￿ w] ! D, y : [w￿; ￿ w] ! [0;h],
and g : [w￿; ￿ w] ￿ f0;1g ! [w￿; ￿ w] denote the associated policy functions, which can be
shown to be uniquely determined, continuous, and bounded.
Given our choice of working on the space of expected discounted utilities, w now summa-
rizes the borrower￿ s partial history of reports. As we have mentioned, we say that there is
a transaction between a lender and a borrower in the current period whose terms are given
by fH [^ u(w)];y (w)g. The quantity H [^ u(w)] gives the loan amount from the lender to
the borrower in the transaction stage, and the quantity y (w) gives the repayment amount
in the settlement stage contingent on the report of the productive state of nature. Both
quantities depend on w, which means that the terms of credit change over time according
to the history of transactions.
Although the lender is committed to delivering a long-term contract, she cannot commit
to a contract that gives her an expected discounted utility that, at any moment, is lower
than that associated with autarky. As a result, individual rationality for the lender requires
that C(w￿; ￿ w) (w) ￿ ￿ holds for all w 2 [w￿; ￿ w]. Recall that a lender needs to pay a cost
￿ > 0 in order to break up a credit relationship. As in Phelan (1995), we motivate this
assumption as a legal cost that a lender has to pay to e⁄ectively walk away from her current
contract with a borrower.
Next we show that, for some values for the lower bound w￿, there exists an upper bound
￿ w = ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the set of expected discounted utilities that gives the highest promised
expected utility to which a lender can commit given that the lowest expected utility that can
be promised is w￿. As we will see later, the market utility w￿ is determined endogenously and
is such that it makes each lender indi⁄erent between entering the credit market by posting
a contract and remaining inactive. Before we proceed, it is useful to de￿ne the following set:
10for any given value for ￿ > 0, let I (￿) =
￿
w : w ￿ wa and C(w;w) (w) ￿ ￿
￿
. Notice that for
any w ￿ wa we have C(w;w) (w) = H (w) ￿ 0. This is the lender￿ s expected discounted cost
of delivering expected discounted utility w to a borrower given that the lender is constrained
to choosing the same continuation values regardless of the state reported by the borrower.
In this case, it is not possible to obtain a repayment from the borrower: The only incentive-
feasible value for y1 is zero. Because H (w) is strictly increasing, we have that I (￿) is an
interval that shrinks as ￿ ! 0.
Lemma 1 For any w￿ 2 I (￿), there exists an upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the set of expected
discounted utilities such that C(w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)) [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] = ￿.
Proof. Let ￿ wF (￿) denote the expected discounted utility for a borrower such that the
expected discounted cost for a lender of providing ￿ wF (￿) given complete information equals
￿. De￿ne the function ￿ : [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)] ! [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)] as follows. For any given w 2
[w￿; ￿ wF (￿)], if there is no w0 2 [w￿;w] such that C(w￿;w) (w0) = ￿, then ￿ (w) = w￿.
Otherwise, ￿ (w) equals the highest point w0 in [w￿;w] for which C(w￿;w) (w0) = ￿. Notice
that C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿ by assumption, which implies that ￿ (w￿) = w￿. For any other ￿ w




k=0 of candidates for the upper bound ￿ w in the following
way. Let w0 = ￿ wF (￿). We have that C(w￿;w0)
￿
w0￿
￿ ￿, with strict inequality if the
truth-telling constraint (4) binds. Also, notice that ￿(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿(w￿;w0) (w￿), which






= ￿. This means that w1 = ￿
￿
w0￿
￿ w0. We proceed







= ￿. Given that ￿(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿(w￿;w1) (w￿), we have that






= ￿. This means that w2 = ￿
￿
w1￿




is a nonincreasing sequence on a closed interval. As a result, it converges to a point w1 in
the interval [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)]. The Theorem of the Maximum guarantees that ￿(w) ￿ C(w￿;w) (w)
moves continuously, which implies that w1 is the highest ￿xed point of ￿. Q.E.D.
11To ease notation, de￿ne Cw￿ (w) ￿ C(w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)) (w) and de￿ne the set Dw￿ ￿ [w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)].
Given that Cw￿ (w) is strictly increasing in w, it follows that Cw￿ (w) ￿ ￿ for all w in the set
Dw￿. This means that, for any given lower bound w￿, Dw￿ gives the set of promised expected
discounted utilities that are actually incentive-feasible. If the truth-telling constraint binds,
then it follows that ￿ w(w￿;￿) > w￿ for any lower bound w￿ satisfying C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿.
Next we show that the truth-telling constraint indeed binds for any w in Dw￿. But ￿rst
notice that the truth-telling constraint (4), together with the constraint 0 ￿ y (w) ￿ h,
implies that g (w;1) ￿ g (w;0) for all w 2 Dw￿, which means that the optimal contract
needs to assign a higher promised expected discounted utility to a borrower contingent on
the realization of the productive state of nature to e⁄ectively induce truthful reporting.
Lemma 2 The truth-telling constraint (4) binds for any w 2 Dw￿.
Proof. Suppose that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 > ￿w0 (6)
holds at the optimum. This implies that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 > ￿w￿ (7)
must also hold at the optimum. Now, reduce the left-hand side of (6) and (7) by a small
amount ￿ > 0 so that both inequalities continue to hold. De￿ne w0
1 = w1 ￿ ￿￿ and
w0
0 = w0+(1 ￿ ￿)￿. Notice that ￿w0
0+(1 ￿ ￿)w0
1 = ￿w0+(1 ￿ ￿)w1 and w0
1￿w0
0 < w1￿w0.











< ￿Cw￿ (w0) + (1 ￿ ￿)Cw￿ (w1),
so that the value of the objective function on the right-hand side of (1) falls. Since all
constraints continue to be satis￿ed, this implies a contradiction. Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of the previous result is that w￿ < ￿ w(w￿;￿) for any given
w￿ 2 I (￿); that is, any w￿ ￿ wa such that C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿.
123.2. Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium
Now, we need to ensure that there exists a market-determined expected discounted utility
w￿ associated with a market contract that makes each lender indi⁄erent between posting a
contract and remaining inactive. This is equivalent to showing the existence of an equilib-
rium.
Formally, a stationary and symmetric equilibrium consists of a cost function Cw : Dw !
R; policy functions ^ u : Dw ! D, y : Dw ! [0;h], g : Dw￿f0;1g ! Dw; and a market utility
w￿ such that: (i) Cw￿ satis￿es (1); (ii) (^ u;y;g) are the optimal policy functions associated
with (1); and (iii) w￿ satis￿es the free-entry condition:
Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. (8)
The market utility w￿ gives the expected discounted utility for a borrower at the signing
date. Due to limited commitment and free entry of lenders in the credit market, it is also
the lower bound on the set of expected discounted utilities.
Proposition 3 Given ￿ > 0, there exist k
ﬂ
(￿) and ￿ k(￿), with 0 ￿ k
ﬂ
(￿) < ￿ k(￿), such







Proof. Notice that Cwa (wa) < 0. We need k > 0 to be such that Cwa (wa)+(1 ￿ ￿)k < 0
and Cw￿ (w￿)+(1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ 0, where w￿ = supI (￿). If Cw￿ (w￿) ￿ 0, then the lower bound
k
ﬂ
(￿) equals 0 and the upper bound ￿ k(￿) is given by the value of k satisfying Cwa (wa) +
(1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. If Cw￿ (w￿) < 0, then the lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿) is given by the value of k
satisfying Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0 and the upper bound ￿ k(￿) is given by the value of k
satisfying Cwa (wa) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. Given that ^ ￿(w) ￿ Cw (w) is continuous in w, there







To show uniqueness, de￿ne the mapping ￿ : [wa;w￿] ! [wa;w￿] as follows. If Cw +
(1 ￿ ￿)k is always greater than zero on [w;w￿], then ￿ (w) = wa. Otherwise, ￿ (w) equals
the point w0 2 [w;w￿] for which Cw (w0) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. We claim that ￿ is nonincreasing
13in w. To verify this claim, we ￿rst need to show that ￿ w(w;￿) is nonincreasing in w. Fix
a lower bound w0 in the set [wa;w￿], and consider the associated upper bound ￿ w(w0;￿).
Take another point w00 > w0 in the set [wa;w￿]. Notice that C(w0; ￿ w(w0;￿)) ￿ C(w00; ￿ w(w0;￿)).
Thus, we have that C(w00; ￿ w(w0;￿)) [ ￿ w(w0;￿)] ￿ ￿ given that C(w0; ￿ w(w0;￿)) [ ￿ w(w0;￿)] = ￿ by
the de￿nition of ￿ w(w0;￿). This implies that ￿ w(w00;￿) ￿ ￿ w(w0;￿), and we conclude that
￿ w(w;￿) is indeed nonincreasing in w. The fact that ￿ w(w;￿) is nonincreasing then implies
that raising the lower bound w only tightens the constraint set. As a result, the point at
which Cw + (1 ￿ ￿)k equals zero is a nonincreasing function of the lower bound w, which
means that ￿ can have at most one ￿xed point. Q.E.D.
Notice that ex ante each lender gets zero expected discounted utility by posting a contract.
Ex post a lender gets a higher utility, given that Cw￿ (w￿) < 0. Moreover, as the contract is
executed, there is no history of reports by the borrower that gives the lender an expected
discounted utility that is lower than that associated with autarky. For this reason, neither
the lender nor the borrower ￿nds it optimal to renege on the credit contract.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently small, then it is possible to have k
ﬂ
(￿) > 0. This means that a stationary
equilibrium may not exist if the initial cost of lending k is too small (below k
ﬂ
(￿)). To
verify this claim, we ￿rst need to show that ￿ w(w;￿) is nondecreasing in ￿. Notice that
￿ wF (￿0) < ￿ wF (￿) for any 0 < ￿0 < ￿. Also, notice that I (￿0) ￿ I (￿). If we ￿x w 2 I (￿0)
and construct the candidate sequences for the upper bound on the set of expected discounted
utilities in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1, we will ￿nd that ￿ w(w;￿0) ￿ ￿ w(w;￿),
which means that ￿ w(w;￿) is indeed nondecreasing in ￿. It is straightforward to show that
we must have Cwa (wa) < 0 for any given ￿ > 0. This means that, for a su¢ ciently small
value for ￿, we have Cw￿ (w￿) < 0. We prove this claim in the appendix. In the proof of
Proposition 3, we need to have k such that Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ 0. If Cw￿ (w￿) < 0, it
could be necessary to have k > 0, which gives rise to a strictly positive lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿).
It is important to keep in mind the possibility that a stationary equilibrium may not exist
when both the cost of walking away from a credit contract ￿ and the initial cost of lending
k are arbitrarily small. In a later section, we will conduct the comparative statics exercise
14of changing the initial cost of lending k holding ￿ ￿xed. However, there may not exist a
stationary equilibrium if we reduce the initial cost of lending too much when ￿ is arbitrarily
small. In Phelan (1995), we have k = 0 and ￿ > 0. Even though the incentive constraints
in his analysis are di⁄erent from ours, the same issue of nonexistence applies: We cannot
guarantee that Cw￿ (w￿) ￿ 0 holds for arbitrarily small values for the cost ￿, in which case
we cannot guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
3.3. Properties of the Optimal Contract
In this subsection, we characterize the policy functions ^ u(w), y (w), and g (w;￿), and es-
tablish some important properties of the optimal contract. We can rewrite the optimization
problem on the right-hand side of (1) in the following way. The relevant constraints for the
optimization problem are (2),
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 = ￿w0, (9)
and
(1 ￿ ￿)(u ￿ y1) + ￿w1 = w. (10)
Here, (9) is (3) with equality, and (10) is obtained by combining (3) and (5). Substituting































y1 ￿ w￿. (11)
The ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of y1 are
H0
￿





w￿ [g (w;0)] +
￿(w)
￿
￿ 1 ￿ ￿, (12)
if y (w) < h, and
H0
￿





w￿ [g (w;0)] +
￿(w)
￿
￿ 1 ￿ ￿, (13)
15if y (w) > 0. The ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of w1 is
H0
￿
























y (w) ￿ w￿
￿
= 0, (15)
where ￿(w) ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (11). Finally, the
envelope condition is given by
C0
w￿ (w) = H0
￿





for any value of w in the interior of the set Dw￿.
Now, we establish some properties of the repayment schedule y (w) and of the optimal
continuation value g (w;￿), with ￿ 2 f0;1g. The latter gives the borrower￿ s expected dis-
counted utility at the beginning of the following period associated with the market contract
as a function of his initially promised expected discounted utility w and his report in the
settlement stage at the current date. If the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility falls
in the subsequent period relative to the current period, this means that the terms of the
contract become less favorable for him ￿and, as a result, more favorable for the lender with
whom he is paired.
Proposition 4 g (w;1) ￿ w for all w in the interior of Dw￿.
Proof. Suppose that g (w;1) < w for some w in the interior of Dw￿. Given that g (w;1) <
w < ￿ w(w￿;￿), (14)-(16) imply
C0
w￿ (w) = ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0




Recall that g (w;1) ￿ g (w;0) and that Cw￿ (w) is strictly convex in w. As a result, we have
C0






16where the last inequality follows because ￿(w) ￿ 0. But this results in a contradiction.
Hence, we conclude that g (w;1) ￿ w for all w in the interior of Dw￿. Q.E.D.
A repayment by the borrower in the settlement stage results in at least the same terms
of credit for future transactions within the credit relationship. If the borrower reports the
productive state of nature in the settlement stage and, as a result, makes a repayment
y (w) to his lender, his expected discounted utility at the beginning of the following period
g (w;1) either rises or remains the same. This means that the terms of credit for all future
transactions within the relationship either become more favorable or remain the same for
him. This property of the optimal contract arises because the lender cannot observe the
borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan in the settlement stage. As a result, the lender needs to
induce a repayment from a borrower who is currently productive in the settlement stage by
promising him at least the same terms of credit for future transactions as those promised
for the current transaction.
Proposition 5 y (w) is nonincreasing on Dw￿.
Proof. Suppose that there is an interval ~ D ￿ Dw￿ on which y (w) is increasing. Then,
there is an interval ^ D ￿ ~ D on which 0 < y (w) < h. Notice that (12)-(14), together with
(16), imply that g (w;1) is constant on ^ D. Then, (9) implies that g (w;0) is decreasing on
^ D, which in turn implies that ￿(w) = 0 for all w 2 ^ D. From (16), we must have
C0
w￿ (w) = ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + 1 ￿ ￿
for all w 2 ^ D. But this implies a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that y (w) is
nonincreasing on Dw￿ as claimed. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 The function g (w;0) has the following properties: (i) g (w;0) < w for all
w > w￿ and (ii) g (w￿;0) = w￿.
Proof. First, notice that we must have y (w) > 0 for all w in the interior of Dw￿. To verify
this claim, suppose that y (w) = 0 for some w 2 (w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)). Because y (w) is nonin-
creasing, we must have y (w0) = 0 for all w0 2 [w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)]. Notice that g [ ￿ w(w￿;￿);0] =
17g [ ￿ w(w￿;￿);1] = ￿ w(w￿;￿) because y [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] = 0 and ^ u[ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] = ￿ w(w￿;￿). Then,
(14)-(16) imply that C0
w￿ (w) ￿ C0
w￿ [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)], which results in a contradiction. Therefore,
we must have y (w) > 0 for all w 2 (w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)). As a result, g (w;1) > g (w;0) for all w
in the interior of Dw￿.
Suppose that g (w;0) ￿ w for some w > w￿. From (14)-(16), we have that
C0
w￿ (w) ￿ ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0
w￿ [g (w;1)] > C0
w￿ (w),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Cw￿ (w) is strictly convex in w and
the fact that g (w;1) > g (w;0). But we obtain a contradiction. Hence, we must have
g (w;0) < w for all w > w￿. Since g (w;0) is continuous in w, it follows that g (w￿;0) = w￿.
Q.E.D.
If the borrower defers his repayment to the lender in the settlement stage, then the terms
of the contract become less favorable for him within the credit relationship. As a result
of intertemporal allocation of resources by a risk-neutral lender, a delayed repayment is
compensated by more favorable terms of credit for the lender in future transactions. When
the borrower reports the unproductive state and, as a result, postpones his repayment
to the lender, such an action creates a liability for the borrower, which alters the terms
of credit for the subsequent transaction within the relationship. Hence, the property of
delayed settlement is part of an optimal mechanism through which the lender obtains more
favorable terms for future transactions within the relationship.
Proposition 7 There exists ￿ > 0 such that g (w;0) = w￿ for all w 2 [w￿;w￿ + ￿).
Proof. Suppose that g (w￿ + ";0) > w￿ for all " > 0. Then, (14)-(16) require that
C0
w￿ (w￿ + ") ￿ ￿C0
w￿ [g (w￿ + ";0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0
w￿ [g (w￿ + ";1)]
holds for all " > 0, which in turn requires that lim"!0 g (w￿ + ";1) = w￿. But, from (9),
y (w￿) > 0 implies g (w￿;1) > w￿, which results in a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Not only the borrower￿ s participation constraint (2) binds at w￿, but it also binds for
values of w in a neighborhood of w￿. This means that a borrower￿ s participation constraint
18not only binds at the signing date, but it also binds after a ￿nite sequence of adverse
productivity shocks. In the following section, we exploit the economic implications of the
previous result. In Figure 1, we depict the schedules g (w;0) and g (w;1).
Notice that, because y (w) > 0 for all w in the interior of Dw￿ and y (w) is nonincreasing
on Dw￿, we must have y (w￿) > 0, which gives the maximum repayment amount that the
lender can collect from the borrower within the credit relationship. Such an upper bound
on the repayment amounts arises due to competition in the market for unsecured loans and
a lack of commitment by borrowers. To clarify this point, consider a situation in which the
borrower has experienced the unproductive state for several periods. Then, the lender ￿nds
it optimal to worsen the terms of the contract for the borrower, resulting in a decreasing
path for the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w. As we have seen, his participation
constraint will eventually bind, in which case the lender is unable to worsen the terms for
the borrower because the latter has the option of walking away and signing with someone
else. Thus, the borrower￿ s ability to quit from his current contract imposes an endogenous
upper bound on the repayment amounts that can be collected from him (contingent on
the realization of the productive state) as well as an endogenous lower bound on the loan
amounts to which he is entitled.
Now we want to better characterize the loan amounts H [^ u(w)]. Notice that the envelope
condition (16) implies that the loan amount to which a borrower is entitled in the transaction
stage is strictly increasing in his promised expected discounted utility w. As we have
seen, the optimal provision of incentives by the lender results in a lower promised expected
discounted utility for a borrower who reports the unproductive state and, as a result, fails
to make a repayment. Thus, the loan amount that the borrower receives from the lender
in the subsequent transaction stage shrinks, given that H [^ u(w)] is an increasing function.
This shows how the loan amount that the borrower receives from the lender in the current
transaction depends on the history of trades within the credit relationship. Notice that
H [^ u(w￿)] > 0 gives the minimum loan amount to which a borrower is entitled during the
transaction stage.
It is useful to de￿ne a statistic that summarizes the terms of credit within each enduring
19relationship. Notice that the expected return to the lender on the current transaction is
given by
R(w) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)y (w)
H [^ u(w)]
, (17)
which summarizes the terms of credit for the current transaction as a function of w. Since
the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w evolves over time within the set Dw￿ according
to the history of transactions between the borrower and the lender, we expect R(w) to
￿ uctuate over time as a result. The following result is an immediate corollary from the fact
that y (w) is nonincreasing and that H [^ u(w)] is increasing.
Proposition 8 The statistic R(w) de￿ned by (17) is decreasing in w.
The statistic R(w), which is depicted in Figure 2, captures the evolution of the terms of
credit according to the history of transactions (summarized by w). This means that R(w￿)
gives the worst terms of credit for the borrower, whereas R[ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] gives the best terms.
The worse terms of credit for the borrower mean that he is entitled to a smaller loan amount
in the transaction stage and/or is required to make a bigger repayment in the settlement
stage, contingent on the realization of the productive state. Notice that the dynamics
for R(w) depend critically on the assumption that the borrower￿ s productivity shock is
privately observed. It is precisely because the lender is unable to verify the borrower￿ s
ability to repay his loan that we observe the spreading of the borrower￿ s expected discounted
utility. To make this point clear, we discuss the case with limited commitment and complete
information in the appendix.
5. DEBT FORGIVENESS AND DELAYED SETTLEMENT
Suppose that at date t > 0 the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility is wt > w￿ and
that he reports ￿t = 0 in the settlement stage. The terms of the contract then become
less favorable for him, which results in a lower promised expected discounted utility at date
t + 1; that is, wt+1 = g (wt;0) < wt. The size of the punishment that the lender imposes
20on the borrower for delayed repayment at date t depends on the borrower￿ s repayment
history, which is summarized by wt. In any case, following a delayed repayment, a smaller
loan amount is granted in the transaction stage at date t + 1 and at least the same state-
contingent repayment amount is required at date t+1 (possibly a bigger repayment amount).
Suppose that g (wt;0) > w￿, which means that the borrower￿ s participation constraint (2)
is not binding at date t. If ￿t+1 = 0, then wt+2 = g (wt+1;0) < g (wt;0) so that the lender
keeps reducing the loan amount and requiring at least the same state-contingent repayment.
Suppose now that g (wt;0) = w￿, in which case the borrower￿ s participation constraint
(2) binds at date t. In this case, the lender o⁄ers the terms fH [^ u(w￿)];y (w￿)g for the
transaction at date t + 1. If ￿t+1 = 0, then the lender continues to o⁄er the same terms
at date t + 2. Why doesn￿ t the lender ask for a bigger repayment to compensate for the
delayed repayment? As we have seen, H [^ u(w￿)] is the endogenous lower bound on loan
amounts and y (w￿) is the endogenous upper bound on repayment amounts, which arise
due to competition among lenders and a lack of commitment by borrowers. From the
lender￿ s point of view, the terms fH [^ u(w￿)];y (w￿)g result in the highest expected return
that she can get within a credit relationship, which is given by R(w￿). The lender would
like to require a bigger repayment amount from the borrower to compensate for the deferred
repayments at dates t and t + 1, but the maximum repayment amount that she can get is
y (w￿).6
For any partial history of adverse shocks for the borrower that does not drive him to w￿,
the optimal contract speci￿es a nondecreasing (possibly increasing) repayment amount to
compensate for deferred settlement. When the lower bound w￿ is reached, that is, when the
borrower￿ s participation constraint (2) eventually binds, the lender needs to ￿forgive￿part
of the borrower￿ s debt to prevent him from walking away. Thus, it is the combination of
asymmetric information with borrowers￿lack of commitment that results in debt forgiveness.
If the borrowers were able to fully commit to the contract at date t = 0, then there would
6Recall that the lender does provide incentives for truthful reporting and is willing to o⁄er the terms
fH [^ u(w
￿)];y (w
￿)g for the transaction at date t + 1 because the expected discounted value of her contract
is strictly positive.
21be no debt forgiveness: The lender would always be able to worsen the terms of the contract
for the borrower whenever the latter deferred his repayment. To make this point clear, we
characterize the optimal contract under full commitment and asymmetric information in
the appendix.7
We interpret the states in which the borrower makes a repayment to the lender as the
settlement of all current liabilities; that is, a repayment discharges all past debts. At the
signing date t = 0, the borrower who is able to repay his loan is rewarded with more
favorable terms of credit after discharging his debt. If he continues to repay his loans, he
will be rewarded with at least the same terms of credit as those he previously had. If he
reports the unproductive state at some date t, then he will delay the repayment of the
loan that he received at date t. If the repayment eventually happens before he reaches the
lower bound w￿ (in which case his participation constraint will not bind), then settlement
happens without debt forgiveness. Otherwise, settlement happens after part of his debt has
been forgiven.
At date t = 0 or at any other date t for which wt = w￿, the lender makes the minimum
loan H [^ u(w￿)] to the borrower in the transaction stage. In the settlement stage, she expects
to receive the repayment amount y (w￿), which is the largest incentive-feasible repayment
amount. If the borrower reports ￿t = 0, then the optimal contract speci￿es that no repay-
ment is required. Otherwise, the borrower produces and transfers the amount y (w￿) to the
lender. Following the partial history ￿t = 0, the lender continues to o⁄er the same terms of
credit at date t + 1. When the lender writes the optimal contract at date t = 0, she takes
into account the possibility of receiving the repayment y (w￿) many periods ahead, even
though she is committed to making the minimum loan amount H [^ u(w￿)]. In this instance,
the lender forgives part of the borrower￿ s debt so that we can still interpret any repayment
7This property of the optimal contract is related to the property of ￿amnesia￿in Kocherlakota (1996),
where a model of two-sided lack of commitment is analyzed; see also Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002). In
these models, the agents￿endowments are publicly observable, and as a result, there is no need for inducing
truthful reporting. Thus, the spreading of expected discounted utilities is not necessarily a property of the
optimal contract, which is a critical aspect of our analysis.
22as the discharge of all current liabilities (given that part of the debt is forgiven). Whenever
the borrower reports ￿t = 1 in the settlement stage and, as a result, makes a repayment,
he discharges all of his past debts.
As we have seen, the property of delayed settlement is an optimal mechanism through
which the lender obtains more favorable terms within the credit relationship. Competition
in the credit market and borrowers￿lack of commitment limit the extent to which the lender
can resort to this mechanism, resulting in debt forgiveness.
6. CHANGES IN THE INITIAL COST OF LENDING
An important parameter in the model is the cost k > 0 that a lender has to pay in order
to post a contract in the credit market. We have seen that there exist k
ﬂ
(￿) and ￿ k(￿), with
0 ￿ k
ﬂ






, there exists a unique market utility
w￿ (k;￿) such that ^ ￿[w￿ (k;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0, where ^ ￿(w) ￿ Cw (w). Again, w￿ (k;￿)
gives a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility from the perspective of the signing date.
We are holding the cost of walking away from a contract ￿ ￿xed. Given that ^ ￿(w) is a
continuous function, for any k0 in a neighborhood of k, there exists a unique w￿ (k0;￿) such
that ^ ￿[w￿ (k0;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)k0 = 0. Moreover, if k0 > k, we have that w￿ (k0;￿) < w￿ (k;￿);
if k0 < k, we have that w￿ (k0;￿) > w￿ (k;￿). In the proof of Lemma 3, we have established
that the upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the set of expected discounted utilities is a nonincreasing
function of the lower bound w￿. Thus, we have that Dw￿(k;￿) ￿ Dw￿(k0;￿) if k0 > k and that
Dw￿(k0;￿) ￿ Dw￿(k;￿) if k0 < k. This means that a lower value for k results in a smaller set
of expected discounted utilities.
We have some important implications. First, a lower value for k makes each borrower
better o⁄ from the perspective of the signing date because the expected discounted utility
associated with the market contract rises: A lower cost of entry results in more competition
in the credit market. Second, there is less variability in a borrower￿ s expected discounted
utility over time. The terms of the contract are such that a borrower￿ s expected discounted
utility ￿ uctuates within a smaller set according to the history of trades. Third, a lender￿ s
23cost function under k0 < k is uniformly above her cost function under k; see Figure 3. This
means that a lower value for k makes each lender uniformly worse o⁄ ex post.8
We can interpret k > 0 as the initial cost of lending per customer for each lender in
the market for unsecured loans. If technological progress drives the cost to nearly zero, we
should expect small ￿ uctuations over time in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility. As
a result, the terms of credit that borrowers receive ￿measured by R(w) ￿are nearly the
same across the population of borrowers, regardless of their particular repayment histories.
Another prediction of the model is that borrowers obtain more favorable terms of credit at
the signing date as the initial cost of lending approaches zero.
If ￿ is very small, then a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility ￿ uctuates over a very
small set as k approaches the lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿). This means that at any point in time
the di⁄erence between the expected discounted utility associated with the worst terms of
credit, given by R(w￿), and the expected discounted utility associated with the best terms
of credit, given by R[w(w￿;￿)], is very small across the population of borrowers. As a
result, a borrower￿ s repayment history does not much a⁄ect the terms of credit that are
o⁄ered to him within a credit relationship. However, a stationary equilibrium may not exist
when both k and ￿ are too small. In this case, there is a strictly positive lower bound on the
initial cost of lending above which we can guarantee that a stationary equilibrium exists.
7. LONG-RUN PROPERTIES
In this section, we study the long-run properties of the equilibrium allocation. Speci￿cally,
we show the existence of a well-behaved long-run distribution of expected discounted utilities
with mobility. Let ￿(Dw￿;D) be the space of all probability measures   on the measurable












8Ex post means after the decision of entering the credit market by posting a contract.






w 2 Dw￿ : g (w;￿) 2 D0￿
.
Notice that a ￿xed point of the operator T￿ corresponds to an invariant distribution over
Dw￿.
Proposition 9 The operator T￿ has a unique ￿xed point  ￿, and for any probability mea-
sure   in ￿(Dw￿;D), T￿n  converges to  ￿ in the total variation norm.
Proof. Let  w denote the probability measure that concentrates mass on the point w. I




(w￿) ￿ " for all w 2 Dw￿.
From Lemma 5, there exists k > 0 such that either g (w;0) ￿ w ￿ k or g (w;0) = w￿ for all
w 2 Dw￿. Now, choose an integer N ￿ 1 large enough so that ￿ w(w￿;￿) ￿ kN ￿ w￿. Then,
the probability of moving from the point ￿ w(w￿;￿) to the point w￿ in N steps is at least
￿N. Since g (w;0) is nondecreasing in w, such a transition to w￿ is at least as probable
from any other point in Dw￿. Thus, if " = ￿N, then the implied Markov process satis￿es
the hypotheses of Theorem 11.12 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), and the proof is
complete. Q.E.D.
The existence of a non-degenerate long-run distribution derives from the fact that there
is no absorbing point, which implies that the entire state space is an ergodic set. The
role of limited commitment is to bound the set of promised utilities, which is necessary to
obtain a non-degenerate long-run distribution. Speci￿cally, the lower bound w￿ on the set
of expected discounted utility entitlements arises due to the fact that a borrower can defect
from his current contract and sign with another lender at any moment. The upper bound
￿ w(w￿;￿) is the highest expected discounted utility to which a lender can commit to deliver
to a borrower given that the lowest expected discounted utility that can be promised is w￿.
8. DISCUSSION
As we have seen, the framework developed in this paper is useful for studying relationship
lending in the market for unsecured loans. In particular, the model allows us to construct
25statistics that make it easier to keep track of the terms of the contract, such as the lender￿ s
expected return R(w) on each transaction, and to derive properties of the optimal contract,
such as delayed settlement and debt forgiveness, that are easily comparable to observable
characteristics of credit markets. Moreover, the optimal provision of intertemporal incen-
tives are meaningful in terms of observed behavior in credit markets so that we can use the
model to study revolving lines of credit and debt renegotiation as equilibrium outcomes.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to extend the model to study
the coexistence of long-term credit arrangements and monetary exchange as alternative
means of payment. In this case, it would be necessary to specify why trade would have to
be quid pro quo in some matches, which would then create a role for a medium of exchange.
For instance, some agents would have to be unable to engage in a credit relationship,
whereas others would be able to engage in long-term relationships; see Nosal and Rocheteau
(2009). Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) propose a di⁄erent rationale for the coexistence
of ￿at money and dynamic credit arrangements, which could also be exploited within the
framework developed in this paper.9
According to the theory of unsecured credit proposed in this paper, two borrowers are
treated di⁄erently by the lenders with whom they are paired only because they have had
distinct repayment histories (due to di⁄erent histories of productivity shocks). Recall that
at the ￿rst date each lender o⁄ers the same contract to a borrower. Borrowers are ex
ante identical and face variable terms of credit over time within their credit relationships
with lenders as a result of di⁄erent histories of productivity shocks. This di⁄ers from
other theories of unsecured credit that assume that borrowers are ex ante heterogeneous
with respect to some characteristic. For instance, in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009),
borrowers di⁄er ex ante with respect to a characteristic that a⁄ects their ability to repay
a loan; in Chatterjee, Corbae, and R￿os-Rull (2008), households di⁄er ex ante with respect
to the likelihood of a loss in their wealth.
In Drozd and Nosal (2008), borrowers are ex ante identical and di⁄er ex post with respect
to their wealth and income. In their analysis, the terms of the contract are ￿xed over time
9See also Shi (1996) and Telyukova and Wright (2008).
26within each relationship between a borrower and a lender. This is a su¢ cient condition for
obtaining default in equilibrium so that it is possible to interpret some results as bankruptcy.
In our paper, we establish some properties of the equilibrium allocation and perform some
comparative statics exercises in an environment in which no restriction on the space of
contracts is exogenously imposed. Although some properties that we obtain are similar to
those in Drozd and Nosal (2008) (for instance, a lower initial cost of lending makes each
borrower better o⁄), others arise precisely because the form of the contract is completely
endogenous.
The analysis in this paper also relates to the models in Temzelides and Williamson
(2001); Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2008); and Andolfatto (2008). Temzelides and
Williamson (2001) use a random matching model to study dynamic payment arrangements
under private information, but with full commitment. As in our analysis, Koeppl, Monnet,
and Temzelides (2008) build on the Lagos-Wright framework to study the essentiality of
settlement to support credit arrangements using mechanism design. In their analysis, there
is no uncertainty in the settlement process, and the consumers always settle all of their re-
maining balances in the settlement stage as a result of preferences that are quasilinear with
respect to leisure. Within the same framework, Andolfatto (2008) studies the implemen-
tation of constrained-e¢ cient allocations through short-term credit arrangements (namely
standard debt contracts). If the settlement process involves some kind of uncertainty, then
the rules for settlement may change signi￿cantly due to the use of intertemporal incentives,
even if we maintain the quasilinear preferences.
Finally, we have assumed throughout the analysis that there is no cost of bankruptcy
for borrowers. Notice that we could introduce a bankruptcy cost in the following way:
Suppose that a borrower would have to pay a non-pecuniary cost ￿ > 0 to walk away from
a credit relationship when he was a debtor, which would happen whenever he delayed his
repayment to the lender, but that he would not incur any cost to walk away when he was
able to settle his previous debt. Recall that we have interpreted the states in which the
borrower makes a repayment to the lender as the discharge of all past debts. Then, the
27borrower￿ s participation constraints would be given by
￿w0 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿w￿
and
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 ￿ ￿w￿.
To sign a new contract, a borrower who is currently a debtor would have to pay a cost ￿ > 0,
which in turn would make it easier for the lender to keep him in the credit relationship.
This would be an interesting extension of the model given the empirical evidence suggesting
that the bankruptcy costs are important for studying consumer credit; see White (2007).10
9. CONCLUSION
We have characterized the terms of the contract that a lender o⁄ers to a borrower in
a competitive credit market with the following characteristics: lenders are asymmetrically
informed with respect to a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan; lenders can commit to some
credit contracts, whereas borrowers cannot commit to any long-term contract; the history
of trades within each enduring credit relationship is not publicly observable; and it is costly
for a lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract. These frictions are
likely to be observed in markets for unsecured loans.
Because of asymmetric information, the lender￿ s optimal contract results in variable terms
of credit: Borrowers with a strong repayment record receive more favorable terms of credit
to ￿nance their future transactions than borrowers who have deferred repayment of previous
debt. This is a mechanism through which the lender obtains more favorable terms for future
transactions within the credit relationship. The borrowers￿inability to commit, together
with competition in the credit market, implies the property of debt forgiveness: Whenever
the borrower￿ s participation constraint binds, the lender needs to forgive part of his debt
to keep him in the relationship. As a result, settlement may take place with or without
debt forgiveness, depending on the history of trades within the credit relationship. For this
10I thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
28reason, loan amounts in the model never fall to zero, even though a borrower may delay
repayment for many periods.
The Lagos-Wright model allows us to make predictions with respect to movements in loan
and repayment amounts over time, which are observable characteristics in credit markets.
There is a distinct settlement stage following each round of transactions, which allows
the borrowers to periodically discharge their past debts. However, there is a friction that
a⁄ects a borrower￿ s ability to settle his debt, which creates a motive for long-term credit
arrangements. Also, the use of the Lagos-Wright model makes the analysis comparable to
other models of inside and outside money.
Finally, if technological progress drives the initial cost of lending to nearly zero, we
should expect small ￿ uctuations over time in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility. As a
result, the terms of credit associated with a lender￿ s contract become very similar across the
population of borrowers, regardless of individual repayment histories. Another prediction
of the model is that a borrower obtains more favorable terms of credit as the initial cost of
lending approaches zero: A market contract is such that each borrower is better o⁄ from
the perspective of the signing date. Although we do not exploit the model￿ s quantitative
implications in this paper, we provide important properties of a lender￿ s optimal contracting
problem in the market for unsecured loans with the characteristics described above.
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32APPENDIX
A.1. Equilibrium with Full Commitment and Complete Information
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium allocation assuming that both the
lender and the borrower can commit to a credit contract at date t = 0 and that the




of observing a particular history of shocks ￿t￿1 2 f0;1g
t for the borrower. Taking as
given the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w 2 D, any lender who decides to enter












t ￿ D ! R+ gives the loan amount to which the borrower is entitled at date t
and yt : f0;1g
t+1 ￿ D ! [0;h] gives the borrower￿ s repayment amount contingent on the



































Let ￿ ￿ 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier on the borrower￿ s individual rationality con-
straint. The ￿rst-order conditions are:
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is a solution to the lender￿ s optimization problem for any given w 2 D.
Let CF (w) denote the cost function associated with the lender￿ s optimization problem.
Then, we have that
CF (w) = ￿[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] + w.










t=0 and a market
utility w￿
F 2 D for the borrower such that: (i) the credit contract satis￿es (18)-(19) and
(ii) the market utility w￿
F satis￿es:
CF (w￿
F) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0.
Notice that w￿
F gives the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility, from the perspective of
date t = 0, associated with the credit contract.
All of these equilibria have the property that the loan amount that the borrower receives





= (1 ￿ ￿)




= q￿, is a solution to the
lender￿ s optimization problem. In this equilibrium, the lender￿ s expected return for each
transaction is given by
R￿ ￿
q￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)k
q￿ .
This is exactly the lender￿ s expected return on her current loan of q￿ given that, in the
settlement stage, she expects to receive a repayment of (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [q￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)k] with prob-
ability 1￿￿ and no repayment with probability ￿. Regardless of the borrower￿ s repayment
history, the terms of credit for the subsequent transaction are exactly the same, which
means that the borrower￿ s expected discounted utility at the beginning of each period is
always w￿
F.
34A.2. Equilibrium with Full Commitment and Incomplete Information
Suppose that both the borrower and the lender can commit to a credit contract at date
t = 0 but that the borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan is privately observable. Let ￿ D be a
compact subset of R, and let ￿ C : ￿ D ! R denote the lender￿ s cost function. The recursive
formulation of the lender￿ s optimal contracting problem is now given by:
￿ C (w) = min
’2￿ ￿(w)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)[H (u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1] + ￿
￿
￿ ￿ C (w0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ C (w1)
￿￿
. (20)
The constraint set ￿ ￿(w) consists of all ’ =(u;y1;w0;w1) in D ￿ [0;h] ￿ ￿ D2 satisfying (4)
and (5). It can be shown that the cost function ￿ C (w) satisfying (20) is uniquely determined,
continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing, and strictly convex. Let ￿ u : ￿ D ! D, ￿ y : ￿ D ! [0;h],
and ￿ g : ￿ D ￿ f0;1g ! ￿ D denote the associated policy functions, which can be shown to be
uniquely determined, continuous, and bounded.
The ￿rst-order conditions for the optimization problem in (20) are
H0
￿
w ￿ ￿￿ g (w;1)
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿ y (w)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ C0
￿





￿ 1 ￿ ￿,
if ￿ y (w) < h;
H0
￿
w ￿ ￿￿ g (w;1)
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿ y (w)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ C0
￿





￿ 1 ￿ ￿,
if ￿ y (w) > 0; and
H0
￿
w ￿ ￿￿ g (w;1)
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿ y (w)
￿
= ￿ ￿ C0
￿





+ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ C0 [￿ g (w;1)].
The envelope condition is given by
￿ C0 (w) = H0
￿
w ￿ ￿￿ g (w;1)
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿ y (w)
￿
.
Following the same steps as in the main text, we can show the following properties of the
policy functions: (i) ￿ g (w;1) ￿ w for all w 2 ￿ D; (ii) ￿ y (w) is nonincreasing on ￿ D; and (iii)
￿ g (w;0) ￿ w for all w 2 ￿ D. An equilibrium is de￿ned in the same fashion as in the main
text, with the market utility w￿ now satisfying the following condition:
￿ C (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0.
35The property of delayed settlement continues to be part of the lender￿ s contract because
the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives still results in the spreading of the bor-
rower￿ s expected discounted utility; that is, ￿ g (w;0) ￿ w ￿ ￿ g (w;1) for all w 2 ￿ D. The
expected discounted utility of a borrower who reports the unproductive state in the set-
tlement stage falls in the subsequent period, which in turn translates into less favorable
terms of credit for him: A smaller loan amount is granted in the subsequent transaction
and at least the same state-contingent repayment amount is required. As we have seen,
asymmetric information results in variable terms of credit, which is a mechanism through
which the lender induces the borrower to repay his debt.
However, there is no debt forgiveness. As long as the borrower continues to postpone the
repayment of his debt, the lender keeps reducing his loan amount and weakly increasing
his state-contingent repayment amount. Once the repayment is collected, the borrower￿ s
previous debt is fully discharged, and his expected discounted utility increases as a result of
more favorable borrowing conditions. With full commitment and asymmetric information,
the dynamics of the model are similar, but no debt is forgiven.
A.3. Equilibrium with Limited Commitment and Complete Information
Suppose now that the borrower cannot commit to the lender￿ s contract and that the lender
can commit to deliver any long-term contract that does not result in an expected discounted
value that, at any moment, is lower than that associated with autarky. Finally, we assume
that the lender can observe the borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan. Let ^ C(w￿; ￿ w) : [w￿; ￿ w] ! R
denote the lender￿ s cost function, which satis￿es the following functional equation:
^ C(w￿; ￿ w) (w) = min




(1 ￿ ￿)[H (u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1]+
￿
h






The constraint set ^ ￿(w￿; ￿ w) (w) consists of all ’ = (u;y1;w0;w1) in D ￿ [0;h] ￿ [w￿; ￿ w]
2
satisfying (2), (3), and (5). It can be shown that the cost function ^ C(w￿; ￿ w) (w) satisfying
(21) is uniquely determined, continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing, and strictly convex. Let
^ u : [w￿; ￿ w] ! D, ^ y : [w￿; ￿ w] ! [0;h], and ^ g : [w￿; ￿ w]￿f0;1g ! [w￿; ￿ w] denote the associated
36policy functions, which can be shown to be uniquely determined, continuous, and bounded.
As in the main text, we can show the existence of the upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) on promised
expected utilities as a function of the lower bound w￿, which in turn allows us to de￿ne the
equilibrium allocation in a similar fashion.
Let ￿0 (w) ￿ 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (2), and let ￿1 (w) ￿ 0 denote
the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (3). The ￿rst-order conditions for the optimization
problem in (21) are
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿






￿ 0 if ^ y (w) < h;
￿ 0 if ^ y (w) > 0;
H0 [^ u(w)] = ￿ ^ C0
(w￿; ￿ w) [^ g (w;0)] ￿ ￿0 (w);
H0 [^ u(w)] = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ C0
(w￿; ￿ w) [^ g (w;1)] ￿ ￿1 (w);
^ u(w) =
w ￿ ￿ [￿^ g (w;0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ g (w;1)]
1 ￿ ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ y (w).
We also need to add the following conditions:
￿0 (w)[￿^ g (w;0) ￿ ￿w￿] = 0;
￿1 (w)[￿^ g (w;1) ￿ ￿w￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ y (w)] = 0.
Finally, the envelope condition is given by
^ C0
(w￿; ￿ w) (w) = H0 [^ u(w)],
for any w in the interior of the set [w￿; ￿ w].
We do not provide a full characterization of the lender￿ s optimal contract, but we derive
a few properties that are relevant to the understanding of the main results of the complete
model. In particular, we want to show that ^ g (w;0) ￿ w for any w ￿ w￿. If ￿0 (w) > 0, then
^ g (w;0) = w￿, in which case the borrower￿ s participation constraint binds. If ￿0 (w) = 0,
then we must have
^ C0
(w￿; ￿ w) (w) = ￿ ^ C0
(w￿; ￿ w) [^ g (w;0)],
37which in turn implies that ^ g (w;0) ￿ w. Therefore, we must have ^ g (w;0) ￿ w for any
w ￿ w￿ as claimed. If the borrower is unable to repay his loan in the settlement stage,
then his expected discounted utility does not fall because there is no need for inducing
truthful reporting. This means that the lack of repayment does not necessarily imply that
the terms of the contract for the borrower worsen, even though his liability increases over
time. As a result, the dynamics of the optimal contract are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
those we have characterized in the main text (when the borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan is
privately observable). Thus, it is the interplay between lack of commitment and asymmetric
information that is important for generating the two key properties of the optimal contract
that we emphasize in this paper.
A.4. Lemma
Here, we show the proof of the following claim: There exists ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently small
for which Cw￿ (w￿) < 0. First, notice that we can show that there exists ￿ w(wa;￿) > wa
such that C(wa; ￿ w(wa;￿)) [ ￿ w(wa;￿)] = ￿ for any ￿ > 0. Thus, we must have Cwa (wa) < 0
for any ￿ > 0. Let f￿kg
1
k=0 be a sequence converging to 0. Then, fw￿kg
1
k=0 converges
to wa (recall that w￿k = supI (￿k)). Because ^ ￿(w) ￿ Cw (w) is continuous (Theorem
of the Maximum), we must have that limk!1 ^ ￿(w￿k) = ^ ￿(wa). Thus, we conclude that
lim￿!0 ^ ￿(w￿) = ^ ￿(wa) < 0. As a result, there exists ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently close to 0 for which
^ ￿(w￿) = Cw￿ (w￿) < 0.
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